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Dublin Castle : the north side of the Upper Castle Yard. Architects uncertain, c.1750-63. The triumphal-arch 
gateways - Mars and Justice - flank the Office of Arms.
... and now the city sleeps; wharves, walls and 
bridges are veiled and have disappeared in the fog 
that has swept up from the sea; the shameless squalor 
of the outlying streets is enwrapped in the grey mist, 
but over them and dark against the sky the Castle still 
stretches out its arms as if for a monstrous embrace.
George Moore , A Drama in Muslin (1886)
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ABSTRACT
The most significant thing about the finding of the Royal 
Commission on the Rebellion in 1916 that the Irish administrative 
structure was 'anomalous in quiet times and almost unworkable in 
times of crisis' was the equanimity with which it was greeted. The 
defectiveness of the existing structure was widely recognised.
There was less agreement about the causes of that defectiveness or 
how they might be remedied.
The main feature which distinguished the administration of 
Ireland from that of the rest of the United Kingdom was the 
existence of a separate Irish Executive. It was a barrier to closer 
union and sometimes promoted greater diversity. The Executive's 
functions were complex and varied, probably too much so. The 
respective powers of its main officers were poorly defined and 
proved a constant source of friction. These weaknesses were exacerbated 
by the weakness of the permanent civil service in Ireland.
Partly because of the absence of an effective contripetal force 
in Dublin Castle, the Irish boards and departments and the Treasury 
in London assumed an added importance. The Irish boards were 
numerous, their functions were poorly defined and often overlapped, 
and their operations were, in many cases, uncontrolled. This was 
guaranteed to infuriate the Treasury which managed to exercise a 
crippling control in some areas of Irish administration. The Treasury 
waged a prolonged campaign to limit Irish expenditure but was 
unsuccessful on this front because the exigencies of politics, more 
than anything else, shaped Irish administrative policy.
This was a two-way process. If political exigencies shaped
administrative policy, the administrative structure was an equally 
important factor in the shaping of Irish politics. That is an 
obvious point but one which has largely been ignored by Irish 
historians. With a few exceptions, they have been too preoccupied 
with the cut and thrust of political history to recognise how much 
is to be learned from the study of the theory and practice of Irish 
administration. The underlying theme of this thesis is the extent 
to which the history of the period 1890-1921 - the last years of 
Dublin Castle - was shaped by the machinery of government.
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XA NOTE ON TERMS AND CONVENTIONS USED
The Irish Government: Tftis term is used throughout in the same 
way as it was used by contemporaries: to refer to those officers 
of the United Kingdom Government who were entrusted with the 
government of Ireland. There was, of course, no independent Irish 
Government. The term 'the Irish Administration' is used in the 
same way. To avoid ambiguity, capital letters have been used when 
referring to the institution of Government and lower case when 
referring to the process of government; similarly with the Irish 
Administration and the administration of Ireland.
Dublin Castle and The Castle: Again following contemporary usage, 
these terms are sometimes used as a shorthand for 'the Irish Govern­
ment' .
Place of Publication: Unless otherwise stated, the place of 
publication of all books cited is London.
xi
INTRODUCTION
It is of course obvious that, could we
start afresh, no such system would be proposed
by the wildest visionary.
Arthur Balfour^
When West Ridgeway came to Ireland as Under Secretary in 1887, 
he brought with him considerable knowledge of colonial administration, 
having served in India as a soldier and as a political agent. His 
description of the system of government he found in Ireland was 
something less than enthusiastic. In a memorandum on the subject he 
declared that
nothing could be more chaotic and effete than the 
present system of government by boards. For at 
present Ireland is ruled by a congeries of boards 
who are by statute semi-independent, and by the 
Treasury in London. These boards have the power 
and licence to commit blunders but on the Chief 
Secretary rests the responsibility. When the Chief 
Secretary happens to be a man of commanding influence 
and when a common danger threatens the existence of 
the Castle this complicated machinery works smoothly, 
but in a cumbersome and unproductive fashion. But 
if this centripetal force were withdrawn all branches 
of Irish administration would fly off in their own 
aimless worn out grooves.^
Though Ridgeway's memorandum was written in 1889, his description 
of the system of government in Ireland remained applicable throughout 
the next thirty years - the last years of Dublin Castle. Indeed the
1. Balfour to Dudley, 15 Aug. 1905, Balfour Papers, British Library 
(hereafter B.L.) Add MS 49,802, f.223.
2. Ridgeway to Balfour, 6 Oct. 1889, Balfour Papers, B.L., Add. MS 
49,810 : quoted in McDowell, The Irish Administration3 p.28.
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period saw an increase in the number of boards and a huge growth in 
the funds disbursed by them. It was a period of growth in and 
extension of government rather than of fundamental reform. It was 
also a period of significant political developments. As a corollary of 
both, the pressure on the 'centripetal force' was greater than ever 
before. The Irish Executive stood between the 'congeries of boards' 
and the Treasury and between the Government and the people. The 
system could not function without it. As the wheel began to spin faster, 
the need for an Executive of 'commanding influence' became more and 
more pressing.
The 1916 Rising was followed almost immediately by the resignation
of the 'triumvirate' who comprised the Irish Executive - the Lord
3Lieutenant, the Chief Secretary and the Under Secretary. It was to
be expected that heads would roll, but the clean sweep made does emphasise
the fact that the Irish Executive was ultimately held accountable for
the successful government of Ireland. Despite the widely accepted
conclusion of the Royal Commission on the Rebellion that the whole
administrative structure was 'anomalous in quiet times, and almost
unworkable in times of crisis', it was still expected that the Irish
4Executive should be able to operate it reasonably efficiently.
One of the main questions to be asked about the Dublin Castle 
system is whether this presumption was not over-optimistic. That is 
a question asked in this thesis. Ridgeway pointed to one aspect of the 
problem when he referred to the need for officers of 'commanding
3. Lord Wimbourne, the Lord Lieutenant, was reappointed after he was 
exonerated by the Royal Commission on the Rebellion.
4. Royal Commission on the Rebellion in Irelands p.4 [Cd 8279], H.C. 
1916, XI.
influence'. There are many others. Commanding influence was 
impossible without ability, experience, tact and access to reliable 
advice. It also required a facility for working with colleagues with 
whom one was in an ill-defined and confused relationship. Even then 
the recipe for success was not complete. Had the administrative 
structure been perfect, the structure of the society to be governed 
would have continued to pose serious problems for English administrators.
The claim that the administrative structure in Ireland was 
'anomalous in quiet times and almost unworkable in times of crisis' 
followed a very brief investigation by the Royal Commissioners. They 
examined only a small number of witnesses and confined their attention 
almost entirely to the period 1912-16. The question which arises is 
whether the system broke down in those years or whether it had always 
contained the seeds of its own destruction. This thesis sets out to 
examine the working of the administrative structure in the quiet times 
and in the times of crisis in order to test the validity of the finding 
of the Commission on the Rebellion.
It is not my intention to write a political history of the years 
1890-1922. No other period in Irish history has been so intensively 
researched and written about by political historians. My concern is 
with the administrative structure and the ways in which it influenced 
the course of events. That necessarily involves dealing with the 
political history of the period but always in the context of the 
administrative structure.
Neither is it my intention to write a comprehensive history of 
the administration of Ireland in the period. Clearly it will be 
necessary to establish how the country was administered in theory and 
in practice and to examine the more important areas and agencies of 
government. But my over-riding concern is with the political question
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and my main concentration will be on that. Administrative history is 
much less well developed in Ireland than political history. R.B. 
McDowell's The Irish Administration 1801-1914s published in 1964, is 
the only major work on the subject. It is all the more fortunate, then, 
that it has proved to be a work of such enduring quality. It is an 
accurate and comprehensive survey, and indispensable even for the 
shorter period 1890-1914.
But,for the historian interested in the last years of Dublin 
Castle, McDowell's book has one major limitation. Because it covers 
a period of over one hundred years, it is obviously not possible to 
examine issues in any great depth. While it does trace the development 
of the-Irish Administration, it does not give any impression of the 
Administration in action. Only by examining the Administration and 
administrators at work is it possible to assess their performance and 
to see inherent defects. For that reason, I have confined this study 
to roughly thirty years. An even shorter period might have allowed a 
more detailed picture to emerge, but probably at the expense of being 
misleading and unrepresentative. It would inevitably have been a static 
rather than changing picture. By including a number of Administrations, 
both Liberal and Tory, it is possible to assess whether and how the 
system changed, and to identify those problems which were unique to 
Liberal or Tory Governments and those which were common to both.
In his description of the system of government West Ridgeway 
identifies three of the most important parties to the administration of 
Ireland : the Irish Executive, the Treasury and the Irish boards and 
departments. Central to this study is the question of where real 
control lay. The four sections of the thesis examine the control 
exercised by the Irish Executive, the boards and the Treasury. It is 
perhaps not surprising that a member of the Irish Executive(Ridgeway)
should claim that the country was ruled by the boards and the 
Treasury. Only by examining the Administration at work is it possible 
to confirm or refute the claim.
As one administrative historian has recently remarked, nothing 
better typifies the importance of the Irish Executive than the fact 
that it was generally referred to as the Irish Government^. He might 
have added that it also symbolised the anomalous position in which the 
executive found itself and typified the misunderstanding which prevailed 
about its status. The Irish Executive was seen as having the 
responsibilities of a colonial governor. But it did not have his power 
or independence. It had, in effect, the status of a department of the 
central Government and was thus answerable on most things to Cabinet and 
Parliament. In Ireland it had the name of being the Irish Government. 
Circumstances were such that it did often in practice have more 
independence than the heads of English departments. But, as will be 
seen later, the control which it could exercise in some areas of Irish 
government was quite limited. Nonetheless, whether the actions of the 
Lord Chancellor or the local Justice of the Peace, the Land Commissioner 
or the bailiff, were in question, they were regarded by the general 
public as being under the immediate direction of the Irish Executive.
But though the Executive was of fundamental importance, it was often 
much less powerful and less ubiquitous than it was given credit (or 
blame)for.
Such misunderstandings about the position of the Irish Executive 
are partly attributable to the differing definitions of its composition. 
The term is, and has sometimes been, used to refer to the senior officers
5. Ronan Fanning, The Irish Department of Finance (Dublin, 1978), p.2. 
For a list of members of the Irish Executive between 1890 and 1922,
see Appendix 1.
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of the Government in Ireland including the Local Chancellor, the 
Attorney General, the Solicitor General and even occasionally the 
heads of the Irish boards and departments and the Commander of the 
Forces in Ireland. More narrowly and more correctly, it is used to 
refer to the Lord Lieutenant, the Chief Secretary and the Under 
g
Secretary. This is a useful and tidy definition containing as it does 
representatives of that trinity of interests, Crown, Parliament and 
Civil Service. However, even this is a little misleading. The Under 
Secretary was not strictly speaking a member of the Irish Exective : he 
was simply the most senior civil servant in Dublin and the Executive's 
Chief adviser and administrator. In reality, however, this made him 
one of the most important officers in the Irish Government. For this 
reason I have devoted a separate section to the role of the Under 
Secretary in the period.
Though this study is concerned with the administration of Ireland, 
it would be undesirable, even if it were possible, to divorce it 
completely from the administration of the United Kingdom as a whole.
The Irish administrative structure was distinctive but it was certainly 
not autonomous. It was linked with Whitehall as much as with Westminster. 
While the Irish boards and departments emphasise how far Ireland 
deviated from the 'norm', the central position of the Treasury emphasises 
the ultimate unity of the system. Both are discussed with this in mind.
It has often been pointed out that the event which more than 
any other governed the course of Irish history in the nineteenth and
6. It is these three which McDowell discusses in his chapter on the 
Irish Executive (pp 52-77) . More recently, Ronan Fanning has 
defined the Executive as a 'triumvirate' composed of the Lord 
Lieutenant, the Chief Secretary and the Under Secretary (Fanning, 
op.cit., p .2).
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Ironically, however, it was the incompleteness of that union which
shaped the administration of Ireland between 1800 and 1921. It is
arguable in particular that when,later in the period, the union was
increasingly threatened, the inability of the Government to respond
to and counter that threat was partly attributable to the weaknesses
7inherent m  the form of union which had taken place.
The Act of Union changed the status of Ireland from that of a 
separate colony (technically a separate Kingdom) to that of an 
integrated part of the United Kingdom. Or at least it was supposed 
to. Though some of the supporters of the Act might have been reluctant 
to admit it at the time, complete integration was the logical 
implication of what was proposed. Thus the union of the two Exchequers 
in 1817 and the gradual equalisation of taxation, especially by Gladstone 
in the 1850's, were seen as merely regularising the new status of 
Ireland. However the Union left Ireland with one vital feature of 
colonial government, a separate Executive. Perhaps it was felt that this 
too, like the Irish Exchequer, would eventually be abolished: there 
were certainly good reasons to proceed slowly towards integration. If 
complete integration was the ultimate goal, progress in that direction 
was not continuous and was never completed. Indeed there were many 
developments which moved in the opposite direction. The existence of a 
separate Irish Executive was a barrier to closer union and it, at times, 
promoted greater divergence.
early twentieth century was the passing of the Act of Union.
7. See O. MacDonagh, Ireland : The Union and its Aftermath (1977),
pp 13-32, F.S.L. Lyons, Ireland Since the Famine (1973), Chapter 3 
and J.C. Beckett, The Making of Modem Irelands 1603-1923 (1966) , 
p .286.
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The successful union of Scotland with England in 1707 was 
quoted as a precedent for what was being proposed in 1800. In 
fact what are more instructive are the differences between the two 
unions. In the case of Scotland, all instruments of separate Scottish 
government were abolished. Only the Scottish legal system survived.
In the case of Ireland, the union did not go much beyond a union of 
Parliaments. Much as the Treasury might have liked to enforce uniformity 
in administration throughout the United Kingdom, it is doubtful whether 
the existing structure would have allowed it.
The Secretaryship for Scotland was abolished as soon as the Stuart
g
threat died away after 1745. This, in itself, may be revealing. It 
was probably the continuance of the equivalent of the Stuart threat in 
Ireland which made successive Governments wary about closer union.
Ireland was too volatile and indiosyncratic in character to invite 
complete integration through the abolition of the Irish Executive. There 
were definite advantages in having a separate Executive to deal with a 
disturbed country not least of which was that the problem was thus 
isolated and less lilely to prove contagious. Unfortunately an 
arrangement which was prolonged to guarantee peace was much less likely 
to be able to cope with the more mundane problems of governing the 
country. Ultimately it was therefore unable to guarantee either peace 
or good government.
8. It was revived in the 1880's.
